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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
T. MORRIS OSTLER,

]

Petitioner,

i Case No. 940713-CA

V•

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE,
STATE OF UTAH,

i Priority No. 14

Respondent.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann. S 6346b-16 (1993), and Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1994).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The following statutory provisions are relevant to the
determination of this case:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
•

• • .

(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court?
(h) the agency action is:

(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons
that demonstrate a fair and rational basis
for the inconsistency.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(4)(g), -16(4)(h)(iii)(1993).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Has Ostler waived both his claims (that the

Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) factual finding is not supported
by substantial evidence and that his license revocation is
unjustifiably inconsistent with past disciplinary actions by the
Commission) by failing to raise them during agency review by the
Department of Commerce?
Standard of Review;

Waiver is an issue decided in the first

instance by the appellate court.

Under the waiver doctrine, a

party petitioning for judicial review of an agency decision is
precluded from claiming Msubstantial prejudice" based on an issue
not presented to the agency.

Gibson v. Board of Review, 707 P.2d

675 (Utah 1985); see Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587
(Utah App. 1990).
2.

Should the Court accept, as supported by substantial

evidence, the ALJ's finding that Ostler induced a buyer to
request reimbursement of earnest money through dishonesty in
light of Ostler's failure to marshall any record evidence that
contradicts this finding?
Standard of Review:

One who challenges an agency's factual

findings under Utah Code Ann. S 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1993) must
marshall all the evidence supporting those findings and then show
that, despite that evidence and the reasonable inferences
therefrom, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence
on the whole record.

Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858

P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993); First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of

2

Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Tasters Ltd, Inc.
v. Department Enrol. Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 18 (Utah App. 1993), cert,
denied, P. 2d (Utah 1994).

If the marshalling burden is not metf

the reviewing court accepts the challenged findings.

E.g.,

Johnson v. Board of Review, 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992).
3.

Even if the issue were properly before this Court, is

there substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that
Ostler induced a buyer to request reimbursement of earnest money
through dishonesty?
Standard of Review:

Substantial evidence is "that quantum

and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.-

First Nat'l Bank, 799

P.2d at 1165; accord Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134,
137 (Utah App. 1992).

A reviewing court does not redetermine

credibility or reweigh the record evidence, Ouestar Pipeline Co.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993).
4.

Even if the claim regarding the sanction of license

revocation has not been waived, has Ostler failed to make out a
prima facie case of inconsistent agency action as required by
Pickett?
Standard of Review:

Whether a petitioner has made out a

prima facie case of inconsistent agency action under Pickett v.
Dep't of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993) and Utah
Code Ann. S 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1993) is a question of law
decided in the first instance by the appellate court.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 28, 1989/ T. Morris Ostler negotiated an earnest
money sales agreement in which Gidalthi 0. Ojeda and his wife
offered to purchase a home in Provo, Utah from Robert and Alice
Skankey.

At that time he was affiliated as an associate broker

with Help-U-Sell of Utah County.

The Ojedas made a $500.00

earnest money deposit which was deposited in Ostler's principal
broker Shane Luck's trust account.

While the sale was pending,

it was discovered that the loan the Ojedas had agreed to assume
was non-assumable.

Mr. Luck instructed Ostler not to close the

transaction because the loan could be called due on the sale of
the property and because title insurance could not be issued on a
property encumbered by this type of loan.
close the transaction through Help-U-Sell.

Mr. Luck would not
On January 18, 1990,

Mr. Luck terminated Ostler's affiliation with Help-U-Sell and his
associate broker license was inactivated.1

(Findings, Addendum

B; Record [hereafter "R."] 118-19).
Notwithstanding the inactive status of his license# Ostler
continued to work with the Ojedas and the Skankeys.

In spite of

Mr. Luck's admonition, Ostler conducted the closing of the sale
on January 22, 1990.2 Ostler received $1,950.00 at the closing
1

Effective February 10, 1990, Ostler's license was
suspended for a one-year period pursuant to an order of the
Commission. The suspension was prompted by Ostler's conviction
on charges of possession of a forged document in connection with
a real estate transaction. (Findings, Addendum B; R. 118).
2

The parties stipulated that the sale closed in February
while Ostler's license was suspended. (Stipulation, R. 100-1).
The ALJ, however, found that "the more substantial evidence

4

which he deposited in his personal checking account.

In

additionf he received funds payable to the Skankeys which he also
deposited into his personal account.

(Findings, Addendum B; R.

119).
Ostler told the Ojedas that they could recover the $500.00
earnest money on deposit with Help-U-Sell by telling Mr. Luck
that the sale had failed.

Sometime prior to February 16, 1990/

Mr. Ojeda contacted Mr. Luck requesting the return of his
$500.00f claiming that the sale had failed.

Mr. Luck made

further inquiries of Ojeda and discovered that the transaction
had in fact closed.

Following Mr. Luck's discovery that the sale

had closed. Ostler attempted to give Help-U-Sell the funds it
would have been due had the sale been closed under its aegis.
Mr. Luck refused the money and paid the $500.00 earnest money to
the Skankeys to whom it should have been credited.

(Findings/

Addendum B; R. 119-20).
After a hearing, in an order dated July 6f 1994/ the
Commission revoked Ostler's license.

(Addendum C; R. 123).

The Commission's order was based on explicit statutory authority:
The commission/ with the concurrence of the director .
. . may suspend/ revoke . . . or deny renewal . . . of
any license . . . if at any time the licensee . . . is
found guilty of:
(6) Failing/ within a reasonable time/ to account for
or to remit any monies coming into his possession which
belong to others, or commingling those funds with his
ownf or diverting those funds from the purpose for
which they were received;
establishes the closing occurred January 22, 1990.M (Findings,
Addendum B; R. 119).

5

(15) Violating or disregarding this chapter, an order
of the commission, or the rules adopted by the
commission and the division;
(17) Any other conduct which constitutes dishonest
dealing.
Utah Code Ann. SS 61-2-11(6), (15), and (17) (1989 & Supp. 1990).
The ALJ concluded that Ostler violated all three sections of the
Utah Code quoted above.

(Conclusions, Addendum B; R. 120). The

ALJ noted that Ostler acknowledged that he received funds owed to
the sellers and deposited those funds in his personal account,
thus commingling them, and failed to remit those funds in timely
fashion, all in violation of section 61-2-11(6).
The ALJ further noted that Ostler acknowledged that he
received a commission when he was not affiliated with a principal
broker and his license was inactive.

He paid himself a

commission although he was not licensed as a principal broker.
Ostler also violated an order previously entered by the
Commission when he disbursed funds from the closing while his
license was suspended.

The ALJ concluded that Ostler "engaged in

multiple instances of misconduct violative of Section 61-211(15)."

Finally, the ALJ found Ostler had "disingenuously and

implicitly encouraged Mr. Ojeda to improperly seek the release of
the earnest monies held by the brokerage."

The ALJ concluded

that Ostler "clearly engaged in dishonest dealings violative of
Section 61-2-11(17)."

(Conclusions, Addendum B; R. 120).

The Commission's order was affirmed on agency review by the
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, Constance B.
White.

Ms. White considered whether the Commission, in revoking

6

Ostler's license, had properly interpreted and applied the
relevant statutory and regulatory provisions relating to Ostler's
conduct.

Ms. White found that the Commission properly considered

all facts in mitigation weighing in Ostler's favor and all
aggravating facts weighing against him.

She concluded that the

revocation order was based upon fact and entered according to
law, and she upheld it in its entirety.

(Addendum A; R. 150-

154).
On December 5, 1994, Ostler filed a petition to stay the
order revoking his license.

(R. 155-57).

The Division denied

Ostler's petition on January 12, 1995, on the grounds that he
poses a substantial threat to the public safety and welfare.

(R.

165-66).
Ostler now requests this Court to set aside the order of the
Department of Commerce affirming the Commission's order revoking
Ostler's license.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Ostler argues that: (1) the ALJ's finding that he induced a
buyer of real property to seek reimbursement of his earnest money
deposit by dishonest means is not supported by substantial
evidence; and (2) the Commission's order revoking his license is
inconsistent with prior agency actions under the Pickett
standard.

Ostler waived both of these claims because he did not

raise them on agency review by the Department of Commerce.3
3

In addition to waiving his claims by not raising them on
agency review, Ostler did not comply with the requirements of
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He has not
7

Even if Ostler had not waived his substantial evidence
claim, he has not met his burden of marshalling all of the
supporting evidence and then the contrary evidence.

Even if the

issue were properly before this Court, there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's finding.

The finding is solidly

based on the testimony of Ostler's former principal broker as
well as the testimony of Ostler himself.

Furthermore, even if

Ostler had not waived his inconsistent sanction claim, he has not
established a prima facie case that the Commission's order was
inconsistent with prior agency action as required by Pickett.
Thus,

Ostler's arguments fail on their merits.

For the reasons

set forth below, this Court should uphold the Department's order
affirming the Commission's license revocation order.
ARGUMENT
I
OSTLER WAIVED BOTH HIS CLAIMS BY FAILING TO RAISE THEM
DURING AGENCY REVIEW BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.
The ALJ found that Ostler induced the buyer in the subject
real estate transaction, Gidalthi 0. Ojeda, to seek reimbursement
of his earnest money deposit by falsely representing that the
transaction had failed when, in fact, it had closed.

Ostler

argues that this finding is not supported by substantial
supported his statement of facts with citations to the record.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). He has not cited the record to show
that the issues he raises were preserved, nor does his brief
contain a statement setting forth the grounds for seeking review
when the issues were not preserved. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5).
Thus, this Court could disregard or strike his brief. Utah R.
App. P. 24(j).

8

evidence.

Ostler further argues that the Commission's order

revoking his license is contrary to the Division's prior practice
under the standard set forth by this Court in Pickett, 858 P.2d
at 191.
Waiver is an issue decided in the first instance by the
appellate court.

Under the waiver doctrine, a party petitioning

for judicial review of an agency decision is precluded from
claiming "substantial prejudice" based on an issue not presented
to the agency.
1985).

Gibson v. Board of Review, 707 P.2d 675 (Utah

In Gibson, this Court stated:

"Issues not raised before

the administrative agency are waived on appeal." Id. at 677. See
also Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990).
Ostler did not raise either of his claims during agency
review by the Department of Commerce.

(Petition requesting

agency review and supporting memorandum, Addendum D; R. 136-43).
Thus, he cannot raise them now on appeal:

"It is axiomatic in

our adversary system that a party must raise an objection in an
earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in
subsequent proceedings."

Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 589.

This Court should, therefore, decline to reach both of the
issues raised by Ostler on appeal.
II
EVEN IF THE FACTUAL CHALLENGE WERE NOT WAIVED, THERE IS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT OSTLER INDUCED A BUYER TO
REQUEST REIMBURSEMENT OF EARNEST MONEY THROUGH
DISHONESTY.
Ostler argues that the ALJ's finding that Ostler induced the
buyer to obtain a refund of his earnest money by dishonest means
9

is not supported by substantial evidence. An agency's factual
findings cannot be upset by a reviewing court if they are
supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a
whole.

Zissi v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah

1992).

-Substantial evidence*1 is that quantum and quality of

relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind
to support a conclusion.

First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at 1165;

accord Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App.
1992).

A reviewing court does not redetermine credibility or

reweigh the record evidence, Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993).
The ALJ found that:
Respondent told Mr. Ojeda that he (the latter)
could inform Mr. Luck the transaction had failed to
obtain the $500 earnest money still held in the Help-USell trust account.
Prior to February 16, 1990, Mr. Ojeda contacted
Mr. Luck and informed the latter that the transaction
had failed. Mr. Ojeda thus requested the return of the
earnest money deposit.
Mr. Luck made further inquiry
and Mr. Ojeda then admitted the transaction had closed.
(Findings, Addendum B; R. 118). The ALJ's finding is
supported by the testimony of Shane Luck, Ostler's principal
broker:
Q:

Do you recall if he told you that—that
Morris instructed you that—that Morris
instructed him to tell you that the deal
had not closed?

A:

That's right, he did say that.

(R. 236-237).

Mr. Luck's testimony is corroborated by Ostler

himself:
10

Q.

You told Mr. Ojeda he had the option to tell Mr.
Luck the deal had not closed?

A.

That's correct.

(R. 211). The ALJ's finding is further supported by the
deposition testimony of Alice Skankey:
A:

He, Morris, asked me to—that I should tell
Help-U-Sell that the deal had fallen through,
and I told him that I couldn't do that because
that would be lying and the deal was going
through with the Ojedas.

(R. 216).
The testimony of Mr. Luck and Ostler, taken together with
the testimony of Alice Skankey, provide "that quantum and quality
of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion."
1165.

First Nat'l Bank, 799 P.2d at

The testimony that Ostler quotes at length in his brief

(Br. of Petitioner at 11-15) supports the ALJ's finding that
Ostler urged Mr. Ojeda to tell Mr. Luck that the transaction had
failed, when in fact it had closed, so that Mr. Ojeda could
obtain his earnest money deposit.
In addition, Ostler argues that the challenged finding is
not supported by substantial evidence because it is based, in
part, on the testimony of Mr. Luck which Ostler maintains is
inadmissible hearsay.

Mr. Luck testified as to his conversation

with Mr. Ojeda in which Mr. Ojeda requested a return of his
earnest money.

(R. 68-70).

Even if Mr. Luck's testimony is

hearsay, hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative
hearings.

UAPA provides:

"The presiding officer may not exclude

evidence solely because it is hearsay."
11

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

8(1)(c) (1993).

And the Utah Supreme Court has long recognized:

"[T]here are significant differences between court trials and
proceedings before administrative agencies. . . . Hearsay
evidence is admissible in proceedings before administrative
agencies.-

Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d

1224, 1226 (Utah 1984); accord Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d
449, 450 (Utah App. 1993).

In support of his contention that Mr.

Shane's testimony is inadmissible hearsay, Ostler cites State v.
Sibert, 310 P.2d 388 (Utah 1957), and State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483
(Utah 1986).

Both of these cases involve criminal matters and

are, therefore, inapposite.
Hearsay is admissible in administrative hearings, but not
without limitation.

"[F]indings of fact cannot be based

exclusively on hearsay evidence.

They must be supported by a

residuum of legal evidence in a court of law."

Yacht Club, 681

P.2d at 1226; accord Maves v. Department of Employment Security,
754 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah App. 1988).

The ALJ's finding that

Ostler had induced Ojeda to request reimbursement of the earnest
money through dishonesty was not based solely upon the testimony
of Mr. Luck.
testimony.

Ostler's own testimony corroborates Mr. Luck's

Ostler admitted at the hearing that he told Mr. Ojeda

that he could try to collect the $500.00 earnest money from HelpU-Sell by telling Mr. Luck that the transaction had not closed.
(R. 211). As noted above, Mr. Luck's testimony is further
corroborated by the deposition testimony of Alice Skankey.
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(R.

216).

Thus, the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial

evidence that satisfies the residuum rule.
Ill
EVEN IF THE CLAIM REGARDING THE SANCTION OF LICENSE
REVOCATION WERE NOT WAIVED, OSTLER HAS FAILED TO MAKE
OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INCONSISTENT AGENCY ACTION AS
REQUIRED BY PICKETT,
Ostler further argues that the Commission's order revoking
his license is contrary to the Division's prior practice.
Whether a petitioner has made out a prima facie case of
inconsistent agency action under Pickett and Utah Code Ann. S 6346b-16(4)(h)(iii) (1993) is a question of law decided in the
first instance by the appellate court.
In Pickett, 858 P.2d at 191, this Court interpreted section
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii) of UAPA.

That section provides that the

appellate court shall grant relief only if it determines that the
person seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by an
agency action which is "contrary to the agency's prior practice,
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency."

The Court determined that "this section requires

a petitioner to establish a prima facie case that the
administrative agency's action in his or her case was 'contrary
to the agency's prior practice."1

Id. (quoting the statute).

Once the petitioner meets this burden, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the agency to demonstrate that the agency's
departure from prior practice had a fair and rational basis.
The Court stated that it would review the agency's explanation
13

Id.

"on the basis of 'reasonableness and rationality.'"

Id. (quoting

SEMECO v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah
1993)(Durham, J., dissenting)).4

Review of the penalty itself

is "limited to determining if the agency has abused the
discretion granted it to impose sanctions."

Id.

Citing Pickett, Ostler argues that the Commission's order
revoking his license is contrary to prior agency practice, and
the Commission has not justified the inconsistency.
Petitioner at 17-19).

(Br. of

Applying this Court's analysis in Pickett,

Ostler has not even taken the first step in supporting his
argument:

Ostler has not established a prima facie case that the

Commission's order was inconsistent with prior agency decisions.
While Ostler claims that the Commission's order in this case is
inconsistent with prior agency decisions, he cites no other
agency decisions in support of his contention.

Thus, Ostler has

not established a prima facie case that the Commission departed
from its previous practice in revoking his license.5
* The Court noted that *[t]he majority opinion in SEMECO
had no occasion to discuss the issue addressed by the portion of
Justice Durham's dissenting opinion which we adopt and did not
otherwise criticize or remark on her discussion of burdens of
proof." Pickett, 858 P.2d at 191 n.9.
5

The instant case is the second action the Division has
brought against Ostler's license. (Order on Review, Addendum A;
R. 150, 152). In February 1990, the Commission issued an order
suspending Ostler's license for a one-year period in connection
with a criminal conviction involving forgery of a quitclaim deed
and boundary line agreement. (Case No. RE89-06-10, R. 171;
Findings, Addendum B; R 119). The Commission's order revoking
Ostler's license for a second violation of Utah real estate law,
committed during a time when his license was suspended for the
first violation, is consistent with prior agency practice. The
Commission has consistently imposed harsher penalties in
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CONCLUSION
Ostler waived both of his claims (that the ALJ's factual
finding is not supported by substantial evidence and that his
license revocation is unjustifiably inconsistent with past
disciplinary actions by the Commission) by failing to raise them
during agency review by the Department of Commerce.

Even if

Ostler had preserved his challenge to the ALJ's factual finding,
there is substantial competent evidence in the record that Ostler
encouraged a buyer to seek the return of his earnest money by
dishonest means.

But even if the challenged finding were not

supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ also based his
recommended order on other findings of statutory violations.
Finally, with respect to his claim that the sanction of
revocation is inconsistent with prior agency decisions, Ostler
has failed to make out a prima facie case of inconsistent agency
action as required by Pickett.

Thus, this Court should affirm

connection with second and third violations, frequently revoking
a license or imposing a long suspension. In In re Makin, RE9109-03 (May 15, 1995), the Commission revoked the license of an
agent in a second violation. (This matter is currently pending
on agency review.)
In In re Turner, RE92-08-01 (May 13, 1994),
an agent consented to the revocation of his license in settlement
of the Division's second action against him. In In re Godfrev,
RE93-01-14 (September 7, 1993), an agent consented to a five-year
suspension of his license in settlement of a second action
against him. In In re Parsons, RE92-08-12 (February 23, 1993),
an agent consented to revocation of her license in settlement of
a second action. In In re Parks, RE88-06-08 (October 18, 1990),
a principal broker consented to revocation of her license in
settlement of a second action brought by the Division against
her. In In re Rogers, RE87-08-02 (December 15, 1988), the
Commission revoked the license of a principal broker after a
hearing on the second action against her. This Court affirmed
the Department's order on appeal. Rogers v. Division of Real
Estate, 790 P.2d 102 (Utah App. 1990).
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the Department's order upholding the revocation of O s t l e r ' s
license.

/}

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s

C&

day of

CLd^C

1995,

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

*2»o

LYNN NICHOLAS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF
T. MORRIS OSTLER TO ACT AS A
REAL ESTATE BROKER

ORDER ON REVIEW
CaseNo.RE90-10.01

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency reviewfiledby
T. Morris Ostler ("Petitioner") following the revocation of his license to act as a real estate broker
by the Real Estate Division ("Division"). The Division entered an order revoking Petitioner's
license on July 6, 1994, to become effective August 8, 1994. Petitioner originally requested
reconsideration from the Division following entry of the revocation order, and the Attorney
General's office moved for dismissal of that request. The Division forwarded Petitioner's request
for reconsideration to the executive director for treatment as a request for agency review.
Petitioner subsequentlyfileda timely request for agency review with the Department and
requested oral argument. This matter is properly before me as a request for agency review; the
request for oral argument is denied however, because the issues appear to be adequately
developed in the pleadingsfiledherein.
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12,
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R151-46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code.
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ISSUES REVIEWED
Whether the Division, in revoking Petitioner's license, has properly interpreted and applied
the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions relating to Petitioner's conduct.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Division commenced this proceeding byfilinga notice of agency action on

July 23, 1991. A hearing was conducted in this matter on April 18, 1994. On July 6, 1994, the
Division adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Real Estate
Commission ("Commission") following the April hearing and thereby revoked Petitioner real
estate broker's license. Those Findings and Conclusions are adopted for purposes of this review.
In addition, Petitioner entered into a stipulation with the Division, by which he expressly admitted
as true certain allegations made by the Division.
2.

In his request for agency review Petitioner contends that the sanction imposed is

too severe under the circumstances. He cites, as mitigating against the sanction imposed, the fact
that Petitioner readily admitted to the Division his error in closing the transaction that gaveriseto
the administrative action at a time when his license was inactive, that Petitioner's motivation
regarding the transaction was the protection of the parties to the transaction, and that no
complaints have been received by the Division regarding Petitioner since the petition wasfiledin
1991.
In place of the Division's order of revocation, Petitioner requests a three month suspension
and afineup to $1000, or as an alternative, suspension of the Division's order of revocation for
some probationary period determined by the Commission.
3.

In response, the Division reasserts its position that the severity of the Petitioner's
2
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misconduct mandates the revocation. It also states that at least one complaint against Petitioner
has been received by the Division since the hearing. I note also that this is the second action
against Petitioner's license . During 1990 and 1991, Petitioner's license had been suspended in
CaseNo.RE89-06-10.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under Department Rule Rl5 l-46b-13(3) the Division's order is stayed pending

completion agency review.
2.

The conclusions of law adopted by the Division following the April hearing

accurately apply the law to the facts in this case. Utah Code Subsection 61-2-11(6) states that the
Division may revoke the license of a licensee if the licensee is found guilty of:
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies coming into his
possession that belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting
those funds from the purpose for which they were received;
Petitioner admitted violating this provision by commingling funds he received after closing
the Skanky-Ojeda transaction. In addition Petitioner admitted violating Utah Code Section 61-21 (prohibiting unlicensed activity) in closing the Skanky-Ojeda transaction and accepting a sales
commission while his license was inactive.
The Commission made afindingregarding the most egregious conduct leading to
Petitioner's license revocation, the dishonest dealing resulting from his inducement of Mr. Ojeda
to request reimbursement of earnest money through dishonesty, in violation of Utah Code
Subsection 61-2-11(17). While Petitioner urges certain facts in mitigation of his conduct, none of
them outweigh the gravity of this fact. Ifindthat the Commission properly considered all facts
mitigating in Petitioner's favor and all aggravating facts weighing against him. Consequently, the
3

13200015

revocation order was based on fact and entered according to law. The Division's order is
therefore upheld in its entirety.
ORDER
Consistent with the preceding analysis, the Division's revocation of Petitioner's license is
upheld in its entirety. Consistent with Department Rule Rl 51-46b-13 (5), the revocation of
Petitioner's license is effective November 28, 1994.
Dated this W

day of October 1994..

Constance B. White, Executive Director
Department of Commerce
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained byfilinga Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16 Utah Code
Annotated.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the £ p

day of October 1994,1 caused to be mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to:
Thomas W. Seiler
Attorney for Petitioner
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
Steven Stewart, Director
Division of Real Estate
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

<^^lzJ*Pttep-*-^

Ban

ADDENDUM B

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the License
of T. Morris Ostler to Act as a
Real Estate Broker

: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
:
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
:
RE90-10-01

Appearances:
Thomas W. Seller for Respondent
Paul M. Grant for the Division of Real Estate
By the Administrative Law Judge:
An April 18, 1994 hearing was conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of the Commerce. The parties initially
submitted a stipulation of undisputed facts. Therefore, evidence was offered and received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review and action by the Real
Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is presently licensed to practice as a real estate broker in Utah, He was

initially licensed as a sales agent in 1975. Respondent became a licensed broker in October 1987
and he was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah County from at least November 1989 to January 18,
1990. During that time, Respondent's principal broker was Shane Luck.
2.

On November 28, 1989, Respondent prepared an earnest money sales agreement, whereby

Gidalthi O. Ojeda D offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and Alice Skankey.
Respondent received $500 earnest money, which he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust
account The Skankeys accepted the offer Help-U-Sell was to be paid a fee totalling $2,450 on the
sale of the home. Respondent's commission, payable from that amount, would total $1,110.
3.

Respondent's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was terminated January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-

Skankey transaction had not closed as of that date. Prior to terminating Respondent's affiliation with
the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if Respondent had any transactions which were still

pinnnni 1 o

pending. Respondent stated no outstanding transactions existed. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction was
scheduled to close on or about January 20, 1990.
4.

Respondent's license was inactivated January 18, 1990 and remained in that status for

approximately three (3) weeks. The license was then suspended for one (1) year, effective February
10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by the Commission (Case No. RE89-06-10). The suspension
was prompted by Respondent's conviction for the possession of a forged document, relative to a real
estate transaction.
5.

On January 20, 1990, the Skankeys executed a warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the

property to the Ojedas. On January 22, 1990, an all-inclusive trust deed was executed by the Ojedas
and notarized by Respondent. The parties have stipulated the closing on the transaction occurred
during February 1990. However, both the buyers and sellers statements reflect the taxes and
mortgage interest payments were prorated as of January 22, 1990. Notwithstanding the parties'
stipulation, the more substantial evidence establishes the closing occurred January 22, 1990. When
Respondent closed the transaction, he knew his license was inactive and that the license would be
suspended in the immediate future.
6.

Mr. Luck had informed Respondent not to close the transaction because the Skankeys had

a non-assuraable loan on the property and title insurance could not thus be obtained. Mr. Luck
further declined to close the transaction through Help-U-Sell due to the existence of that loan, which
included a due-on-sale clause, and Mr. Luck's belief the Ojedas did not understand the possibility the
loan could be called due on the sale of the property. Moreover, Mr. Luck did not desire to expose
Help-U-Sell to any liability under those circumstances.
1.

Mr. Luck was not aware Respondent had closed the transaction on January 22, 1990.

Respondent received $1,950 at closing as the balance of the selling fee and he deposited those funds
in his own checking account Respondent also received funds payable to the Skankeys and deposited
those monies in his checking account Respondent told Mr. Ojeda that he (the latter) could inform
Mr. Luck the transaction had failed to obtain the $500 earnest money still held in the Help-U-Sell
trust account
8.

Prior to February 16, 1990, Mr. Ojeda contacted Mr. Luck and informed the latter that

the transaction had failed. Mr. Ojeda thus requested the return of the earnest money deposit Mr,
Luck made further inquiry and Mr. Ojeda then admitted the transaction had closed. Mr. Luck
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requested all closing documents be delivered to Help-U-Sell.
9.

On or about February 16, 1990, Respondent tendered an $840 check to Help-U-Sell. The

February 16, 1990 checkrepresentedthe selling fee which would have been payable to the brokerage
less the earnest money still on deposit By letter, dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck returned the
closing documents to Respondent, advised Respondent that the Skankeys had been informed
Respondent would have the closing documents and informed Respondent that the Skankeys wanted
"their closing documents and money immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent prorations
with Ojeda".
10. Mr. Luck also informed Respondent that he assumed Respondent would provide "the
appropriate documents concerning this transaction to the Ojedas". Mr. Luck further stated Help-USell would notify Respondent of "a fee due to us from you for the loss of business to us as a result
of your actions". Based on the advice of legal counsel that the closing should remain Respondent's
responsibility, Help-U-Sell did not accept the February 16, 1990 check. Respondent disbursed the
funds due to the Skankeys on February 16, 1990 and Mr. Luck subsequently sent the earnest money
deposit to the Skankeys. The Ojedas eventually defaulted on their purchase of the property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-2-11 provides a civil penalty not to exceed $500 may be imposed
and a real estate license may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee,
whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of:
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any
monies coming into his possession that belong to others, or
commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those funds from
the purpose for which they were received.
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission or
the rules adopted by the commission and the division;
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing.
Section 61-2-1 provides it is unlawful for any person to act as a principal broker without a
license. Section 61-2-2 further provides a principal broker's license is required to receive valuable
consideration for negotiating or closing a sale of real estate. Moreover, Section 61-2-10 provides it
is unlawful for any associate broker to accept a commission from any person except the principal
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broker with whom he is affiliated and that an inactive licensee is not authorized to conduct real
estate transactions.
Respondent acknowledges he received funds owed to the Skankeys on the closing of the
transaction, he deposited those funds into his personal account and thus commingled those funds with
his own monies. Respondent closed the transaction January 22, 1990, but he failed to remit monies
due to the Skankeys within a reasonable time after the closing of the transaction. Respondent thus
violated Section 61-2-11(6) in both instances.
Respondent also acknowledges he received a commission from the sale of the property when
he was not affiliated with a principal broker and his license was inactive. Respondent paid himself a
sales commission and fees for closing the transaction, although he was not licensed as a principal
broker and was thus not entitled to receive consideration directly from the parties. Further,
Respondent violated the order previously entered by the Commission when he disbursed funds from
the closing of the transaction while his license was suspended by reason of that order. Respondent
thus engaged in multiple instances of misconduct violative of Section 61-2-11(15).
Respondent also suggested Mr. Ojeda erroneously inform Mr. Luck the transaction had closed
as the means whereby Mr. Ojeda might obtain the earnest money held on deposit through the HelpU-Sell brokerage. Respondent thus disingenuously and implicitly encouraged Mr. Ojeda to
improperly seek the release of the earnest monies held by the brokerage. Given the foregoing,
Respondent clearly engaged in dishonest dealing violative of Section 61-2-11(17). A proper factual
and legal basis clearly exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's license.
Respondent urges certain mitigating factors should be considered with regard to any
disciplinary action taken on his license. Specifically, Respondent contends the Ojedas and the
Skankeys were highly motivated to close the transaction because the Ojedas would have no place to
live and the Skankeys would incur a negative cash flow if the transacation did not close. Respondent
also asserts neither party suffered any damage because the transaction was closed, the brokerage
unreasonably refused to close the transaction and Respondent merely desired to assist the Ojedas and
the Skankeys as to promote their interests.
The parties to this transaction obviously desired a sale be completed. It is unclear from this
record whether either party suffered any damage by reason of Respondent's unilateral decision to
close the transaction without the knowledge of and participation by his brokerage. There is no
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sufficient evidence to find and conclude either the Ojedas or the Skankeys did not understand the
significance of the non-assumable loan or the existence of the due-on-sale clause. Respondent may
have been somewhat motivated by his desire to assist both the Ojedas and the Skankeys in their
desire to complete this transaction.
However, various aggravating factors exist as to Respondent's misconduct The Court finds
and concludes Respondent expended substantial efforts to realize the sale of the property, prompt the
closing of this transaction and that he thus anticipated receiving compensation for those efforts.
Significantly, Respondent ignored the consequences of his licensure status as he proceeded to close
the transaction when his license was inactive and later disbursed funds from the transaction while his
license was suspended. The Court is further disturbed by Respondent's characterization of the
suspension of his license as a mere "technicality" which would preclude his ability to close the
transaction. Simply put, Respondent cavalierly continued to act as a broker without any regard for
the fact his license was inactivated and later suspended.
The Court duly acknowledges the Division has received no complaints of any misconduct
undertaken by Respondent during the three years since his license was reinstated. Nevertheless,
Respondent willingly disregarded those statutes which govern his licensure, particularly when
partially influenced by the prospect of financial gain. The Court further finds and concludes
Respondent lacks any genuine acknowledgement of-or significant remorse for-his misconduct. To
the contrary, Respondent has basically questioned the reluctance of the brokerage to close the
transaction, minimized his role in Mr. Ojeda's attempt to improperly obtain the earnest money
deposit and characterized his actions as well-intentioned efforts designed to merely promote the
interests of the Ojedas and the Skankeys. The serious nature of Respondent's misconduct, coupled
with his misguided and questionable attitude, compels the conclusion a severe sanction should be
entered as to his license.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked.
Dated this

of July, 1994.

linistrative Law Judge

>
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ADDENDUM C

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the License
of T. Morris Ostler to Practice as a
Real Estate Broker

ORDER
RE90-10-01

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is
hereby confirmed and adopted. The real estate broker license of T. Morris Ostler is hereby
revoked, effective August 8, 1994.
Dated this (MI^ day of July, 1994.
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION:

Claudia E. Ashby (Vice Chair)

The above Order is confirmed and adopted by the undersigned this
July, 1994.

*»

%U_
/

day of

Steven H. StewafffDlrector
Division of Real Estate
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ADDENDUM D

THOMAS W. SEILER
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER
Attorney for T. Morris Ostler
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
In the Matter of the License
of T. MORRIS OSTLER to act
as a Real Estate Broker

) PETITION REQUESTING
AGENCY REVIEW
)
)

Case No. RE90-10-01

COMES NOW PETITIONER, T. Morris Ostler, pursuant to
U.C.A. §61-1-12 (1953 as amended) and the Utah
Administrative Code §R151-46b-13, by and through his counsel
of record Thomas W. Seiler of ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER and
requests Agency Review of the Order dated July 6, 1994 which
revoked his license to act as a Real Estate Broker in the
State of Utah.

This petition is accompanied by a brief in

support of grounds for review.

Petitioner, further requests

oral argument be heard as to the merits of the review.
DATED this

/

day of August, 1994/rj,

T. MORRIS OSTLER

^ o ,

sEILER

t^^^U:*
*«*UJ.

.

T

^

»<

THOMAS W. SEILER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR AGENCY REVIEW was
mailed, with postage prepaid thereon, on the j *SK day of
August, 1994, to the following:
Shelly K. Wismer
Department of Commerce
Heber M. Wells Building
163 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Utah Real Estate Commission
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Paul Grant
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capital
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Sander J.
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

Mooy
Attorney General
Capital
City, UT 84114

Constance White
Executive Director of the
Utah Department of Commerce
Heber M. Wells Building
163 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Cn

AA

ft x *J

nJhk

g:rivers\litigati\9513A.pet
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THOMAS W. SEILER (#2910)
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER
Attorney for T. Morris Ostler
80 North 100 East
P. O. Box 1266
Provo, UT 84603
Telephone: (801) 375-1920

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

In the Matter of the License
Of T. MORRIS OSTLER to act
as a Real Estate Broker

)
)
)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR
AGENCY REVIEW

)

)

Case No. RE90-10-01

Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Code R151-46b13, Petitioner T. Morris Ostler hereby submits his Brief in
Support of Petioners Request for Agency Review of the aboveentitled matter.
FACTS
1.

Petitioner is presently licensed to practice

as a real estate broker in Utah.

He was initially licensed

as a sales agent in 1975. Petitioner became a licensed broker
in October 1987 and he was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah
County from at least November 1989 to January 18, 1990.
During that time, Petitioner's principal broker was Shane
Luck.
2.

On November 28, 1989, Petitioner prepared an

earnest money sales agreement, whereby Gidalthi 0. Ojeda D
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offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and
Alice Skankey.

Petitioner received $500.00 earnest money,

which he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust
account.

The Skankeys accepted the offer.

Help-U-Sell was

to be paid a fee totalling $2,450 on the sale of the home.
Petitioner's commission, payable from that amount, would total
$1,110.00.
3.

Help-U-Sell had full control of the $500.00

earnest money deposited in its trust account and ultimately
delivered the same back to the Skankeys.

The Petitioner

tendered the balance of Help-U-Sell's commission to Help-USell, which tender was refused.
4.

Petitioner's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was

terminated on January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction
was not closed as of that date.
5.
with

the

Prior to terminating Petitioner's affiliation

Help-U-Sell

brokerage,

Mr.

Luck

inquired

if

Petitioner had any transactions which were still pending. At
that time the Skankey-Ojeda transaction appeared as though it
would not close.
6.

This information was given to Mr. Luck.

Petitioner's license was inactivated January

18, 1990 and remained in that status for approximately three
(3) weeks.

The license was then suspended for one (1) year,

effective February 10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by
the Commission (Case No. E89-06-10).
2
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7.

On January 20, 1990 the Skankeys executed a

warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the property to the
Ojedas.

On January 22, 1990 an all-inclusive trust deed was

executed by the Ojedas and notarized by the Petitioner.

The

Administrative Law Judge found that the closing occurred on
January 22, 1990, some four days after the Petitionees
license was inactivated.
8.

On or about February 16, 1990, Petitioner

tendered an $840.00 check to Help-U-Sell.

The February 16,

1990 check represented the selling fee which would have been
retained by the brokerage less the earnest money still on
deposit.
returned

By letter, dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck
the

closing

documents

to

Petitioner,

advised

Petitioner that the Skankeys had been informed Petitioner
would have the closing documents and informed Petitioner that
the

Skankeys wanted

"their

closing

documents

and

money

immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent prorations
with Ojeda."
9.
transaction.

Help-U-Sell

was

unwilling

to

close

this

The Skankeys (sellers) and the Ojedas (buyers)

were extremely anxious to cause the sale to go forward.

In

the absence of the sale the Skankeys believed they would be
significantly damaged.

Indeed, Dr. Skankey testified in his

deposition conducted on Friday, June 4, 1993 at page 31, lines
12 through 16:
3
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Skankeys

Q:

So, Dr. Skankey, our question is, is that
if you assume for a minute that the Ojeda
sale didn't take place, and no one
followed through on it, would that have
been harmful to you?

A:

Yes.

10.

The Respondent disbursed all funds due the

(sellers)

on

February

16,

1990.

Mr.

Luck

subsequently sent the earnest money deposit to the Skankeys.
11.

Neither the Skankeys nor the Ojedas suffered

any damaged by reason of the Petitioner's action in closing
this transaction.
12.

The Petitioner was motivated to close this sale

as a result of his desire to assist both the Ojedas and the
Skankeys in their desire to complete this transaction.
13.

In

light

of

the

determination

by

the

Administrative Law Judge (J. Steven Eklund) that the closing
occurred

on January

22, 1990, four

(4) days

after the

Petitioner's associate broker's license was inactivated, the
Petitioner could have re-activated his own principal broker's
license, prior to the closing date, and completed

this

transaction. The transaction would have been no different had
this license been reactivated, but rather, would have been
consummated

in

the

identical

manner

it

was

in

fact

consummated.
14.

The only person or entity claiming any damage
4
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in this matter is a claim by Mr. Luck on behalf of Help-USell

for

lost

business.

The

broker's

portion

of the

commission was either controlled by Help-U-Sell (in the form
of the $500.00 Help-U-Sell earnest money deposit) or tendered
to Help-U-Sell

(in the form of a check in the amount of

$840.00 delivered by Petitioner to Help-U-Sell)•
15.

The

recommended

order

as prepared

by the

Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner's license as
a real estate broker be revoked.

The Utah Real Estate

Commission confirmed and adopted the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order as prepared by the
Administrative Law Judge.
16.
license

is

a

Revocation of the Petitioner's real estate
severe

disciplinary

sanction.

Petitioner

respectfully requests that the sanction be reviewed and a
hearing be held on the same, particularly in light of:
a.

Mr. Ostler's admission

in his initial

response addressed to the Department of Commerce,
Blaine

E.

Twitchell,

Director,

wherein

the

Petitioner admits that the transaction should have
been finalized through the brokerage;
b.

Mr. Ostler's motivation to close this sale

to avoid harm to the Skankeys as set forth in Dr.
Skankey's deposition; and
c*

There have been no complaints received by
5
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the Department of Commerce, Division of Real Estate,
against this Petitioner for actions taken by this
Petitioner since the date of the transaction which
is the subject matter of the petition filed herein.
In that interim# the Petitioner has worked in the
real estate industry.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner requests that the Order
of July 6, 1994 be reviewed and, upon review, that the
sanctions imposed therein be amended to a three (3) month
suspension and a fine of not more than $1,000.00.

To the

extent it is within the Executive Director's authority, it may
be appropriate to, rather than amending the entire sanction,
suspend the sanction for the purpose of putting the Petitioner
on a probationary status for one year or such other time
period as to the Commission may seem appropriate.

It is

further requested that the sanction not be invoked until such
time as this matter may be heard on the merits.

/**
DATED this /

/I

day of August. 1994.

T. MORRIS OSTLER
Petitioner
SEILER & GLAZIER

^ ' — — JA
THOMAS W. SEILER^^
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION was,
mailed, with postage prepaid thereon, on the pT day of«
19£4, to the following:
Shelly K. Wismer
Department of Commerce
Heber M. Wells Building
163 East 300 South
P. 0. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Utah Real Estate Commission
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

(7 copies)

Paul Grant
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capital
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Sander J.
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

Mooy
Attorney General
Capital
City, UT 84114

Constance White
Executive Director of the
Utah Department of Commerce
Heber M. Wells Building
163 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

[02959.pld]
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